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Introduction 
After fifteen years of independence, there 
are practically no democratic institutions 
in  place  in  Uzbekistan.  Only  a  few 
individuals are struggling to set up any 
viable alternative. The prevailing Soviet 
mentality in the country is set against a 
traditional, archaic group/family-driven 
political landscape. The lack of freedom 
has become an enormous obstacle to 
good governance. In particular, the lack 
of freedom of religion has been serving 
as  a  catalyst  for  radical  Islamisation, 
due  to  the  complete  absence  of 
political  space  in  the  country.  This 
was  aggravated  by  dramatic  declines 
in  income  and  employment  and  the 
growing poverty during the post-Soviet 
transition to a market economy. All of 
this  has  led  to  a  loss  of  the  stability 
and  security  that  people  previously 
enjoyed.  This  mix  of  economic  and 
political  stress  is  further  exacerbated 
by the ailing regime of Islam Karimov 
– the only Uzbek establishment known 
by  most  Uzbek  citizens.  Alongside 
the repressive ruling methods and the 
increasingly inward-looking focus of the 
political elite, Karimov’s age has raised 
the single most important ‘what next?’ 
question. 
Four  years  after  the  2005  Andijan 
crackdown  and  the  subsequent 
sanctions by the EU, almost nothing has 
changed and the European Union (EU) 
still seems to be struggling to establish 
a credible policy towards the ‘heart of 
Central Asia’. Germany appears as the 
most  active  European  presence,  and 
its  policies  are  perceived  to  prioritise 
stability and security. European policy 
intentions  are  announced  to  promote 
human rights, development,  education 
and  water  and  environment  policies, 
but these seem illusory in the absence 
of political change.
Formalised democracy: Eurospeak?
If  the  frequency  of  international 
meetings were a democracy indicator, 
Uzbekistan  would  steadily  be  moving 
towards democracy. In recent months, 
Tashkent  has  been  hosting  numerous 
roundtables, conferences and seminars 
on human rights, democracy, the rule of 
law and civil society. However, the few 
independent civil society representatives 
in  the  country  have  not  been  able 
to  attend.  Thus,  there  has  been  no 
discussion,  and  media  reports  have 
merely heralded the facts. The current 
regime  understands  the  mechanisms 
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Certainly, the years 2006-2008 were a notable period for 
the  attention  given  to  democracy  and  human  rights  in 
Uzbekistan, in comparison to any other previous period. 
There was a dramatic increase in rhetoric on human rights 
issues, but the situation continued to deteriorate. Tashkent 
developed a belief that Europeans like speeches, but do 
not necessarily want deeds. 
One of the most significant achievements of the last year 
would seem to be the introduction  on 1 January 2008 
of the institute of habeas corpus – meant to safeguard 
individuals from state-ordered detention – into the national 
criminal  justice  system.  Unfortunately,  this  has  turned 
out to be a mere formality. The introduction of the post 
of special judge to hear cases on the fairness of pre-trial 
arrest, or to cancel the closed court proceedings, might 
help.  However,  torture  and  other  forms  of  ill-treatment 
have remained rampant in the criminal justice system in 
Uzbekistan. According to credible reports, such practices 
commonly occur before formal charges are made, while 
evidence obtained under torture is continuously accepted 
as the main form of proof (boiling to death a suspect a few 
years ago remains the most notorious case). Only a limited 
number of cases of appeal or complaint reporting torture 
or similar ill-treatment have been officially registered and 
the authorities tend to open criminal cases under articles 
205-206 (Abuse of power and official authority), but not 
under article 235 (Use of torture and other cruel, inhuman 
and degrading types of treatment and punishment) of the 
Criminal Code. 
Another severe problem in Uzbekistan is human trafficking. 
In April 2008, the Uzbek Parliament adopted a law “On 
combating human trafficking”, along with the establishment 
of the Inter-Departmental Coordination Commission, with 
subsequent  regional  commissions,  and  of  the  National 
Rehabilitation  Centre  for  victims  of  human  trafficking. 
Nevertheless,  the  government  has  continued  with  the 
practice of only recognising as victims those exploited in 
commercial sex, ignoring the cases of thousands of labour 
migrants. Independent sources estimate that 80 percent 
of human trafficking victims are Uzbek labour migrants to 
Russia and Kazakhstan. 
In  February  2009,  in  a  most  unlikely  move,  given  the 
widespread  state-sponsored  use  of  child  labour  in  the 
cotton industry, Uzbekistan adopted a law “On guarantees 
of the rights of the child”. In addition, the country has ratified 
two international Conventions of the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO), which prohibit the worst forms of child 
labour  and  set  a  minimum  age  for  employment.  In  the 
autumn of 2008 before the beginning of the annual cotton-
picking  season,  the  Uzbek  government  also  adopted  a 
decision to exclude children from forced cotton-picking. 
Official legislation notwithstanding, this year children have 
been  forcedly  conscripted  into  cotton-picking,  as  well 
as  religious  communities  connected  to  local  mosques, 
workers of state owned enterprises and businesses, law 
enforcement officers and regular armed forces.
Comparisons  with  Belarus  leave  impressions  of  double 
standards  -  what  the  EU  advocates  as  the  minimum 
requirements  in  Belarus  matters  less  in  Uzbekistan. 
Currently, more than 20 political prisoners continue to serve 
prison terms. As in Belarus, but with more severe brutality, 
in Uzbekistan these prisoners are used mainly to terrorise 
independent representatives of civil society and for political 
negotiations with Western countries. Religious prisoners 
are in an even worse situation. If the authorities identify an 
‘extremist’, his/her family members are also perceived as 
potential extremists. It is hard to estimate the number of 
religious prisoners due to restrictions on access to prisons. 
It is equally difficult to say whether trends in arrests based 
on religious charges are decreasing or increasing. Given 
that no political opposition is allowed, religion is the last 
bastion for opponents. The more widespread such policies 
become, the more they will radicalise the Muslim society 
in Uzbekistan.
Civil society is highly fragmented in Uzbekistan and given 
the lack of access to factual and analytical information, it 
often resorts to superfluous material of poor quality. During 
the past few years, no new independent and critical non-
governmental organisation (NGO) or human rights group 
has been registered by the government, but more than 50 
existing NGOs have had to close down. Harassment of 
journalists continues in Uzbekistan and those who publish 
what the government considers “hostile” information are 
persecuted. According to the latest amendments to the 
Criminal  Code  adopted  on  17  February  2004,  sharing 
information critical of the country’s human rights situation 
is  grounds  for  persecution.  More  than  ten  independent 
journalists are currently in prison, others are forced into 
silence and many have left Uzbekistan under fear of criminal 
persecution. International media outlets are denied state 
accreditation. The government continues to block access 
to  the  Internet.  Self-censorship  has  proven  effective 
because every journalist knows the regime’s red lines on 
content, and so adjusts his or her output accordingly. 
The EU’s Strategy and Uzbekistan: a missed 
opportunity? 
To  date,  the  Partnership  and  Cooperation  Agreement 
(PCA)  formally  determines  relations  between  the  EU 
and  Uzbekistan,  along  with  limited  bilateral  relations 
with separate EU member states. Three major stages of 
relations can be identified: 1) relations based on the PCA 
in the early 1990s when Uzbekistan gained independence; 
2) the deterioration of relations and EU sanctions against 
Uzbekistan in 2005 after Andijan; 3) the rapprochement 
between  the  EU  and  Uzbekistan  in  early  2007  and  the 
adoption of the EU Strategy on Central Asia. 
The  EU  has  gradually  come  to  recognise  the  strategic 
importance of Uzbekistan and in broader terms Central 
Asia. The German EU Presidency of the first half of 2007 
pushed actively for what became “The EU and Central 
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However the EU has only been represented in Tashkent by 
a project implementation and management support office 
established by the European Commission. 
In  the  Strategy,  the  EU  pays  particular  attention  to  the 
differences  between  Central  Asian  countries  and  has 
adopted both a country-specific tailored bilateral approach 
and a broader regional policy. Uzbekistan’s challenges are 
to be addressed in part through regional projects, including 
such issues as border control; the fight against organised 
crime;  drug  and  arms  trafficking;  terrorism;  transport; 
the  distribution  and  utilisation  of  water  resources;  and 
environment policies. Issues such as human rights, the 
rule of law, good governance and democracy, education, 
economic  development,  trade  and  investment,  energy, 
and  inter-cultural  dialogue  are  dealt  with  on  a  bilateral 
basis with Uzbekistan, as with other states of the region. 
In theory, the Strategy is a welcome step as it indicates 
more  engagement,  more  resources  and  more  attention 
to  the  specificities  and  pragmatic  ways  of  interacting 
with Uzbekistan, as well as pushing forward the regional 
integration  at  the  Central  Asian  level.  But  what  does  it 
mean in practice? 
The  Strategy  presents  a  dilemma  for  the  EU  as  most 
priority  issues  inevitably  depend  on  political  reform  in 
Uzbekistan. Even improving the distribution and utilisation 
of water resources, as well as addressing cross-border 
human  and  drug  trafficking,  environmental  degradation 
and the continuing salination in the Aral Sea basin cannot 
be  achieved  without  some  degree  of  political  opening, 
regional cooperation and subsequent reforms. However, 
the Uzbek regime has shown no indication of an opening. 
Tashkent  wants  to  focus  on  the  “common  threats  and 
challenges”, which are mainly associated with combating 
terrorism  and  religious  fundamentalism,  as  one  of  the 
seven priority areas of cooperation indicated by the EU 
Strategy. The regime continues to take small steps forward 
(such as the newly opened border between Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan) just to be able to take two steps back 
whenever it feels necessary. 
Less attached to strong geopolitical interests than Russia, 
China and the US, the EU is in a better position to assist 
the regime progress along a transition trajectory. However 
it has to make it clear that Uzbekistan – now and in any 
form of post-Karimov transition – must address its political 
reluctance  to  embrace  reform,  its  autocratic  political 
regime, gross human rights violations, corruption and the 
lack of social perspective in many areas. Emphasising the 
EU Strategy’s overall development dimension is the political 
message the EU can develop and communicate. However, 
this  message  is  lost  due  to  insufficient  communication 
with the local population and insufficient contact with the 
ruling elite. 
A  lack  of  precise  benchmarks  in  the  strategy  makes 
independent  monitoring  and  evaluation  difficult  and 
will continue to affect its implementation. Moreover, the 
entire  process,  including  discussions,  development, 
incorporation into national systems (in early 2008 the EU 
developed bilateral priority papers with each of the Central 
Asian states) and implementation of the Strategy was an 
“insiders’ game” and elite-driven. Lack of public information 
about the EU’s Strategy and its relations with Uzbekistan 
necessarily leads to virtually non-existent public awareness 
within  the  country  concerning  the  EU’s  intentions.  The 
strategy paper was not directly available in Russian and 
has yet to be translated into Uzbek. Many stakeholders in 
Central Asia depend on the European Union for detailed 
and reliable information on how the Strategy is applied in 
practice. All these factors, if not remedied, will further limit 
the EU to mere observer status in the power struggle over 
Karimov’s successor – one of the key development factors 
in current Uzbekistan. 
What the EU has brought to Uzbekistan: interest and 
hope 
While  pointing  to  human  rights,  democracy,  good 
governance and the rule of law as priority issues, senior 
EU officials (such as the EU Special Representative and 
his staff) are hardly putting pressure on the human rights 
record of states in the region. The Strategy fails to put 
pressure on the Uzbek regime. This allows Tashkent to 
choose what suits its own policy path and continue to 
play its usual role: each time a UN human rights treaty 
monitoring body adopts a set of specific recommendations, 
the authorities respond by adopting a National Action Plan 
on the implementation of the recommendations. There are 
no changes in practice as a result. 
After  the  13  May  2005  Andijan  massacre,  at  which 
hundreds of civilian protestors were shot by the security 
forces, the EU imposed sanctions against Uzbekistan (by 
the Common Position 2005/792/CFSP of the Council of the 
EU adopted on 14 November 2005). The Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Uzbekistan 
was suspended and visa restrictions on key individuals 
were  imposed,  as  was  an  embargo  on  arms  supplies. 
These measures started to be eased two years later in 
November 2007, and only the arms embargo now remains 
effective. The sanctions brought some limited progress in 
the field of human rights with the release of imprisoned 
human rights activists and the introduction of judicial and 
legislative reforms. In dropping most of the sanctions, the 
issues of human rights, democratisation and the rule of 
law were at least brought to the table in EU-Uzbekistan 
relations. However most of these changes are of short-
term character, and do not represent systemic reforms and 
most remain on paper. Indeed, released political prisoners 
can be re-arrested any day. Nevertheless, such measures 
at least brought some hope for ordinary Uzbeks as they 
represented the first major policy action from Europe; a 
principled stand towards the regime from a major world 
power.  In  this  sense,  EU  sanctions  against  Uzbekistan 
did their job that time. Furthermore, when the EU started 
rolling back the bulk of the sanctions in mid-2007, there 
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All  its  deficiencies  notwithstanding,  one  should  be 
under no illusion that the EU’s position is an easy one. 
Uzbekistan remains a difficult partner to deal with for all 
international actors: China, the EU, Russia and the United 
States. Tashkent is a partner that cooperates only on its 
own terms with countries it chooses – this is the essence 
of its multi-vector foreign policy. Nonetheless, even within 
this framework the EU could still be the best partner for 
Uzbekistan in terms of its inclusiveness and development 
dimension. 
What should the EU focus on? 
There is an obvious fear among European policy-makers 
that  putting  too  much  emphasis  on  human  rights, 
democratisation and the rule of law could drive Uzbekistan 
further into the orbit of Russia and China and move it further 
away from Europe. Moreover, some observers see the EU’s 
position as too moralistic, and thus counterproductive to 
the EU’s diversification of its energy imports. Brussels is 
well aware that the current elite has built its ‘multi-vector’ 
foreign policy as a strategy to get as much as possible 
for  very  little  in  return.  But  the  EU  should  also  bear  in 
mind the possibility of different scenarios for the end of 
the Karimov regime. Brussels should step up its contacts 
with the political elite at all levels in order to be prepared 
for the post-Karimov regime, whatever form it will take. 
Meanwhile it needs to engage the elite by explaining that it 
is in the regime’s interest to start with reforms and prepare 
for transformation and ease social tensions. 
The  Uzbek  public  mainly  compares  the  EU  to  Russia, 
the ‘policy model’ the local officials and population have 
been engaged with the most. The EU cannot and should 
not  compete  with  Russia,  as  in  terms  of  political  and 
economic  weight  it  is  comparatively  under-represented 
in Uzbekistan. However, it can show the Uzbek public a 
different development path based on engagement with all 
possible stakeholders. The EU should pay special attention 
to analytical, public awareness and communication projects 
in order to provide as much information as possible about 
its own message, and open up the information space in 
and around Uzbekistan. 
The EU has more chance of being perceived as an honest 
broker in Uzbekistan than the US, giving it the credibility to 
press for reforms, for the enhancement of the political space 
and for greater political pluralism. If such an engagement 
is applied consistently, with proper incentives and regular 
explanation  of  the  threats  of  current  policies/practices, 
Uzbek authorities may open the door a bit further. 
A  structured  human  rights  dialogue,  which  has  already 
been launched, could be valuable in order to engage with 
the embattled human rights community. The EU should 
put  greater  emphasis  on  promoting  human  rights  and 
democratisation, and ensuring the active involvement of 
local civil society, human rights groups, parliaments, local 
authorities and other actors in the ‘public events’ attached 
to  the  human  rights  dialogue.  Engaging  with  various 
stakeholders, not only with the central authorities, along 
with  public  communication  of  the  Strategy,  would  give 
greater impetus to European efforts. To achieve this, the 
EU must ensure that the Strategy does not become an 
official ‘rigid’ paper, but is maintained as a living and flexible 
document. The implementation of the Strategy should not 
become  an  insiders’  game.  All  related  information  and 
papers should be made public and translated into Uzbek, 
with greater recourse to open, public events. 
What the EU mostly lacks in Uzbekistan are diverse natural 
partners. The regime could easily point to the fact that 
they are the only ones left to talk to. As stated above, 
Uzbekistan lacks any form of structured civil society to 
ensure public scrutiny of the government and to provide 
a system of checks and balances on the implementation 
of  EU  policies.  The  main  hope  lies  in  engaging  those 
thousands of talented young Uzbeks who have studied 
abroad  on  various  Western  scholarships  and  returned 
home. The EU should invest in the development of stronger 
and independent civil society groups by engaging young 
professionals. 
Conclusion 
Uzbekistan is not an easy or predictable partner; on the 
contrary, it is full of (self-) importance. The Strategy on 
Central Asia, which has made the EU a new international 
player in the region, has also presented it with a dilemma, 
as most of the priority issues inevitably depend on political 
reforms in Uzbekistan. However, the EU is short of tools 
to influence the situation on the ground. The sanctions 
following Andijan were appropriate and served a certain 
limited purpose, but could not bring about durable policy 
change.  The  EU  can  hardly  pursue  a  realistic  regional 
approach by keeping the most populous country of the 
region in isolation while engaging with similar regimes (such 
as Turkmenistan). However, once the EU is on the path of 
rapprochement, this should at least be taken seriously. 
The EU should put the strongest accent on the development 
dimension,  clearly  communicating  its  message  and 
engaging  with  as  many  stakeholders  in  Uzbekistan  as 
possible.  The  EU  must  make  its  message  about  the 
importance of reforms heard within and beyond the Uzbek 
political elite. Long-term EU commitment and engagement 
geared  towards  Uzbekistan’s  development  may  help  to 
build relations and create clarity on both sides. This would 
be not realpolitik, but a realistic policy. 
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About EUCAM
The  Fundación  para  las  Relaciones  Internacionales  y  el  Diálogo  Exterior 
(FRIDE), Spain, in co-operation with the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS),  Belgium,  has  launched  a  joint  project  entitled  “EU  Central Asia 
Monitoring (EUCAM)”. The (EUCAM) initiative is an 18-month research and 
awareness-raising exercise supported by several EU member states and civil 
society organisations which aims: 
- to raise the profile of the EU-Central Asia Strategy; 
- to strengthen debate about the EU-Central Asia relationship and the role of 
the Strategy in that relationship; 
- to enhance accountability through the provision of high quality information 
and analysis; 
-  to  promote  mutual  understanding  by  deepening  the  knowledge  within 
European and Central Asian societies about EU policy in the region; and 
- to develop ‘critical’ capacity within the EU and Central Asia through the 
establishment of a network that links communities concerned with the role of 
the EU in Central Asia.
EUCAM focuses on four priority areas in order to find a mix between the broad 
political ambitions of the Strategy and the narrower practical priorities of EU 
institutions and member state assistance programmes:
•  Democracy and Human Rights 
•  Security and Stability 
•  Energy and Natural Resources 
•  Education and Social Relations 
EUCAM will produce the following series of publications:
 - A bi-monthly newsletter on EU-Central Asia relations will be produced and 
distributed broadly by means of an email list server using the CEPS and FRIDE 
networks. The newsletter contains the latest documents on EU-Central Asia 
relations, up-to-date information on the EU’s progress in implementing the 
Strategy and developments in Central Asian countries.
  -  Policy  briefs  will  be  written  by  permanent  and  ad  hoc  Working  Group 
members. The majority of the papers examine issues related to the four core 
themes  identified  above,  with  other  papers  commissioned  in  response  to 
emerging areas beyond the main themes.
 - Commentaries on the evolving partnership between the EU and the states 
of Central Asia will be commissioned reflecting specific developments in the 
EU-Central Asian relationship. 
  - A  final  monitoring  report  of  the  EUCAM  Expert  Working  Group  will  be 
produced by the project rapporteurs. 
This  monitoring  exercise  is  implemented  by  an  Expert  Working  Group, 
established by FRIDE and CEPS. The group consists of experts from the 
Central Asian states and the members countries of the EU. In addition to 
expert  meetings,  several  public  seminars  will  be  organised  for  a  broad 
audience including EU representatives, national officials and legislators, the 
local civil society community, media and other stakeholders. 
EUCAM  is  sponsored  by  the  Open  Society  Institute  (OSI)  and  the 
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project is also supported 
by the Czech Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and the United Kingdom Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office.
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